论文总字数：54077字

摘 要

双重股权结构是指公司发行不同类型的普通股，这些普通股拥有不同的投票权。换言之，双重股权结构是公司在投票权上做出特殊安排的股权结构，该结构能够帮助管理层以少量的资本投入掌控公司，但同时也内生了天然的代理冲突。另一方面，随着互联网、人工智能、生物医药等新型科技蓬勃发展，越来越多的企业采用双重股权结构来保证管理层和创始股东掌握公司绝大部分的投票权，进而把控公司重大经营和财务决策，以激励企业家创新创业、保持公司前后政策的连贯性与一致性等。目前，国内外学者对于双重股权结构的研究大多基于公司治理层面且研究结论一直好坏参半。随着近年来我国许多互联网企业（如：百度、京东等）纷纷赴美同股不同权上市之后，越来越多的学者及相关人员开始考虑同股不同权制度在我国实施的可能性。显然随着我国众多高新技术企业的崛起，市场对于双重股权结构是有需求的；但同时双重股权结构的不利影响也是不容忽视的，而中国资本市场的不完善也使得该制度的实施变得更加困难。基于以上分析，既然双重股权结构在公司层面的矛盾难以调和，而中国目前在双重股权结构问题上的归结点又是该制度是否会对本就脆弱的中国资本市场产生冲击，所以本文跳出公司治理、站在一个更广的层面——资本市场来分析其所带来的影响，以期能为双重股权结构的利弊之争找到一个突破点，同时也希望能为中国对该制度的接受与否提供一定的参考与帮助。

本文以中国在美国上市公司作为研究对象，通过分析双重股权结构对股价同步性的影响，来了解其对资本市场的影响。研究结果表明：（1）在宏观层面来看，目前双重股权结构公司主要分布在互联网应用类软件与消费信贷（金融业）行业，而这两个行业的股价同步性水平较高；在微观层面，采用双重股权结构公司的股价同步性普遍要高于行业均值。这些都说明了双重股权结构会提高股价同步性，降低资本市场传递信息的效率；（2）从回归结果来看，相较于单一股权结构公司，双重股权结构公司的股价同步性整体偏高，即双重股权结构对股价同步性具有消极影响；（3）具体来看，相较于单一股权结构公司，双重股权结构公司管理层持股的投票权对股价同步性的消极影响更显著，而现金流权对股价同步性的积极影响更显著；且两权分离程度越大，对股价同步性的消极影响越显著。

关键词：双重股权结构，股价同步性，两权分离

ABSTRACT

  The dual shareholding structure refers to the shareholding structure in which the company owns different voting rights’ stocks. In other words, the dual shareholding structure is the shareholding structure which makes special arrangements on the voting rights, and it is the asymmetric distribution mechanism of control rights. The structure can realize the separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and the separation of these two powers leads to a natural proxy conflict in the dual equity. On the other hand, more and more companies use the dual equity structure to give founding shareholders most voting rights to control the company, further controlling the company's major business and financial decisions, stimulate entrepreneurs' innovation and entrepreneurship, ensure the coherence of corporate policies and development, prevent malicious acquisitions and protect the interests of professional managers. At present, for the dual-equity structure, most domestic and foreign scholars' research is based on corporate governance issues such as agency issues, company value, investment and earnings management, and the research conclusions have not been consistent. It is precisely because of the mixed situation of the dual-equity structure that the dual-equity structure has been subject to academic controversy since its birth. With the fact that many Internet companies in China (such as Ali and Jingdong) have IPO in the United States and HKEx accept dual ownership structure on April 30, 2018, more and more scholars and relevant personnel began to consider the possibility of implementing the dual-equity structure in China. Obviously, the market has a demand for dual ownership structure. But at the same time, the adverse effects of the dual equity structure cannot be ignored and the imperfection of China's capital market makes the implementation of the institution more difficult. Based on the above analysis, since the dispute over the dual-equity structure at the company level is difficult to reconcile,this article jumps out of corporate governance and research it at a broader level - the capital market to analyze the impact of it, in order to find a breakthrough point.

This paper takes the non-panel equilibrium data of Chinese companies listed in the US as a research sample, and using stock price synchronization as an indicator to measure the performance of the capital market. The impact of the shareholding structure on stock price synchronicity explores the effect of the system on the capital market. The results show as follows: (1) At the macro level, the current dual-equity structure companies are mainly distributed in the Internet application software industry and consumer credit industry, and the mean of these two industries have higher stock price synchronicity; at the micro level, the dual equity structural companies' share price synchronicity is generally higher than the industry average. All of these illustrate that the dual equity structure will increase the synchronicity of stock price and drop the efficiency of information delivery in the capital market. (2)As for the regression results, compared with the single equity structure company, the double-equity structure company that owns multiple stocks at the same time has higher stock price synchronization. (3) The impact of the management shareholding of the two types of companies on the stock price synchronicity is different. Compared with the single equity structure company, the greater the separation of the voting rights and cash flow rights the more significant negative impact on stock price synchronicity.

KEY WORDS: dual equity structure, stock price synchronicity, separation of powers

目 录

摘 要 I

ABSTRACT II

第一章 绪论 1

1.1研究背景 1

1.2 相关概念界定 1

1.2.1股权结构 1

1.2.2双重股权结构 2

1.2.3股价同步性 2

1.3研究意义 3

1.4研究内容、思路与方法 5

1.4.1研究内容与思路 5

1.4.2研究方法 7

1.5可能创新点 7

第二章 制度背景、理论与文献综述 9

2.1制度背景 9

2.2理论基础 10

2.2.1委托代理理论 10

2.2.2最优内部人控制假说 10

2.2.3控股股东掠夺假说 12

2.2.4有效市场假说 12

2.3文献综述 13

2.3.1双重股权结构的现状与内涵 13

2.3.2关于双重股权结构的研究历程与现状 13

2.3.3关于股价同步性的研究历程与现状 14

2.3.4文献简评 15

第三章 研究假设与研究设计 17

3.1研究假设 17

3.2数据、变量与模型建立 19

3.2.1数据与样本来源 19

3.2.2变量设置 20

3.2.3回归模型 23

第四章 实证结果与分析 25

4.1描述性统计分析 25

4.2相关性分析 28

4.3回归结果分析 30

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