论文总字数：39121字

摘 要

近年来，上市公司违规问题出现井喷，其中信息披露违规最为严重。而违规的上市公司当中，有许多公司已经连续多年榜上有名。本文运用博弈理论分析了上市公司连续违规行为的动因，并给出了相应的治理方式。

首先，运用不完全信息动态博弈理论建立了上市公司与监管部门和投资者的一次博弈模型和无限期重复博弈模型，通过分析其均衡条件，得出上市公司是否违规取决于其财务状况、违规的超额收益、违规成本、被监管或曝光的可能性以及被监管或曝光后的损失，而违规却没有被发现的上市公司更加倾向于连续违规，这是为了换取投资者信任的可能性，从而获得未来时期更高的收益。

其次，结合财务风险传染理论和演化博弈理论描述了上市公司与监管部门所构成系统的长期演化过程，通过均衡分析发现，演化稳定策略与纯策略纳什均衡相同。但在存在混合策略纳什均衡的情况下，系统处于周期性震荡状态，不存在演化稳定策略。在此情况下分析了有限理性下已受罚的上市公司仍然会再次违规的原因，据此给出了一种选择性监管的对策，分别运用数学证明和仿真测试说明了该对策的有效性。

最后，根据本文得出的结论，分别从上市公司、监管部门和资本市场角度，给出了相应的政策建议，为政策制定和执行部门提供更丰富的政策制定依据和决策参考。

关键词： 上市公司 连续违规 不完全信息动态博弈 演化博弈 财务风险传染

The Evolutionary Dynamics of Listed Companies’ Repeated Violations

Abstract

In recent years, listed companies’ violations emerge in large numbers, most of which are corporate financial misrepresentations. Besides, some of the listed companies have been punished for violations repeatedly. This paper analyzes the causes of listed companies’ repeated violations employing game theory, and advances some corresponding policy suggestions.

First, employing incomplete information dynamic game, this paper models a simple game and an infinitely repeated game between listed companies, regulators and investors. The equilibrium condition suggests that the possibility of listed companies’ violations depends on the companies’ financial situation, excess earnings and costs of violations, the possibility of detection or exposure and the corresponding losses. The listed companies which have not been detected or exposed are more likely to commit fraud repeatedly, in order to gain the trust of the investors and thus the possibility of higher future returns.

Second, this paper models an evolutionary dynamic system of listed companies and regulators employing the financial contagion theory and evolutionary game theory. The equilibrium condition suggests that the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is equal to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the classic games. However, in the case when there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the classic games, the possibilities of violations and detection in the evolutionary dynamic system oscillates periodically and ESS does not exist. This paper analyses the causes of the punished companies repeated violations under bounded rationality, thus advances a strategy of selective regulation, and proves its effectiveness employing mathematical reasoning and computer simulation respectively.

Finally, according to the conclusions above, this paper advances some corresponding policy suggestions from the aspects of listed companies, regulators and capital market respectively, providing a frame of reference for policy formulation and decision making.

Keywords: listed companies, repeated violations, incomplete information dynamic game, evolutionary game, financial contagion

目录

摘要 I

Abstract II

第一章 绪论 5

1.1选题背景与研究意义 5

1.1.1选题背景 5

1.1.2 研究意义 5

1.2研究思路与方法 5

1.3结构安排 6

1.4创新之处 8

第二章 文献综述 9

2.1上市公司违规行为的理论综述 9

2.2财务风险传染理论综述 11

2.3演化博弈理论综述 12

2.4目前研究的不足 13

第三章 上市公司违规行为监管的不完全信息动态博弈 14

3.1引言 14

3.2一次博弈模型 14

3.2.1博弈假设 14

3.2.2博弈均衡分析 16

3.3无限期重复博弈模型 17

3.3.1博弈假设 17

3.3.2博弈过程 18

3.4本章小结 20

第四章 上市公司连续违规行为监管的演化博弈 21

4.1引言 21

4.2模型构建 22

4.2.1上市公司财务风险传染模型 22

4.2.2上市公司违规行为监管的演化博弈模型 22

4.2.3上市公司财务风险传染与违规行为监管的演化博弈模型 24

4.3博弈均衡分析 24

4.4上市公司连续违规行为监管的博弈分析 31

4.4.1上市公司连续违规行为的博弈分析 31

4.4.2上市公司连续违规行为的选择性监管对策 32

4.4.3选择性监管的有效性分析 34

4.4.4仿真测试 37

4.5本章小结 38

第五章 研究结论与展望 39

5.1主要研究结论 39

5.2相关建议 40

5.3研究不足与展望 40

参考文献 42

致谢 44

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