上市公司高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的研究

论文总字数：26068字

摘 要

高管薪酬与盈余管理之间的关系是近年来国内外经济管理研究领域备受关注的话题之一。公司制下经营权和所有权两权分离，公司股东委托高管经营公司，与高管订立以会计利润为基础的薪酬契约，以此激励并约束公司高管。虽然薪酬契约能在一定程度上连结公司股东与公司高管之间的利益，并在某种程度上减少代理成本，但由于目前我国资本市场发展不成熟，市场化程度与发达国家相比还存在一定的差距，相应的监督体制仍有不完善之处，公司高管仍可能利用公司的监督成本高和信息不对称性追求自身利益，为取得相应的薪酬奖励而进行盈余管理，损害公司股东和其他利益相关者的利益。

为深入探究高管薪酬与盈余管理两者的因果关系，本文以符合条件的2012-2016年沪深两地区上市的A股制造业公司为样本，利用Roychowdhury模型对这些样本公司进行真实盈余管理的统计，以测度公司的盈余管理力度。并将高管薪酬激励划分为货币薪酬、隐性薪酬和股权激励三个方面，分别与真实盈余管理进行实证统计分析。本文的研究结果表明：货币薪酬与真实盈余管理呈显著负相关关系，即真实盈余管理的程度会随着高管货币薪酬的增加而减少；股权激励与真实盈余管理呈显著正相关关系，即真实盈余管理的程度会随着公司股权激励的实施而增加；隐性薪酬与真实盈余管理存在先递减后递增的U型相关关系，即当高管隐性薪酬较低时，真实盈余管理的程度会随着隐性薪酬的增加而减少，当高管隐性薪酬较高时，真实盈余管理的程度会随着隐性薪酬的增加而增加。最后，本文根据实证结果，提出针对企业发展、管理层激励制度等方面的建议及措施。

关键词：高管薪酬，真实盈余管理，货币薪酬，股权激励，隐性薪酬

Abstract

The relationship between executive compensation and earnings management is one of the topics that have attracted much attention in the field of domestic and foreign economic management research in recent years. Under the company system, the right to operate and ownership are separated. The company’s shareholders entrust senior executives to run the company and enter into a compensation contract based on accounting profits with the senior executive to motivate and constrain the company’s senior management. The compensation contract can link the interests between the shareholders and the executives of the company to a certain extent, and reduce the agency cost to some extent. However, because of the immature development of the capital market in China, there is still a certain gap in the degree of marketization compared with the developed countries, and the corresponding supervision system is still imperfect. The company's senior executives may still use the company's high supervision costs and information asymmetry to pursue their own interests, carrying out earnings management so that obtain corresponding awards, damaging the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.

To explore the causal relationship between executive compensation and earnings management in depth, this paper takes qualified 2012—2016 A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a sample,using the Roychowdhury model to calculate companies’ real earnings management which can be used as a measure of earnings management of listed companies. The compensation incentives for senior executives are divided into three parts:monetary compensation, equity incentives and implicit slary, and they are empirically analyzed statistically with real earnings management. This study shows: monetary compensation and real earnings management are significantly negatively correlated. That is, the degree of real earnings management will decrease with the increase of monetary compensation;equity incentives and real earnings management are significantly positively correated. That is, the extent of real earnings management will increase with the implementation of company equity incentives; there is a U-shaped correlation that decreases first and then increases between implicit salary and real earnings management. That is, when implicit salary is low, the extent of real earnings management will decrease with the increase of implicit salary. When the implicit salary is high, the degree of real earnings management will increase with the increase of implicit salary. Finally, based on the empirical results,the paper made suggestions and measures for enterprise development, management incentive system and so on.

KEYWORDS:Executive compensation,Real earnings management,Monetary compensation,Equity incentives,Implicit salary

目 录

摘要 I

Abstract II

第1章 绪论 1

1.1 研究背景 1

1.2 研究意义 1

1.2.1 理论意义 1

1.2.2 现实意义 1

1.3 论文结构和技术路线 2

第2章 文献综述 4

2.1 文献综述 4

2.1.1 盈余管理 4

2.1.2 高管薪酬激励与盈余管理 5

2.2 文献评述 6

第3章 研究设计 7

3.1 研究假设 7

3.2 模型设计 7

3.2.1 真实盈余管理与货币薪酬 8

3.2.2 真实盈余管理与股权激励 8

3.2.3 真实盈余管理与隐性薪酬 8

第4章 实证分析 10

4.1 样本与数据来源 10

4.2 被解释变量（真实盈余管理） 10

4.2.1 异常经营现金流的估算： 10

4.2.2 异常生产成本的估算： 10

4.2.3 异常操作性费用的估算： 11

4.2.4 盈余管理综合指数REM_Index_i,t的计算： 11

4.3 解释变量 11

4.3.1 货币薪酬变量 11

4.3.2 股权激励变量 11

4.3.3 隐性薪酬变量 11

4.4 控制变量 12

4.4.1 公司规模： 12

4.4.2 资产负债率： 12

4.4.3 净资产收益率： 12

4.4.4 上市持续时间： 13

4.5 变量表 13

4.6 实证分析过程 13

4.6.1 变量的描述性统计 13

4.6.2 实证检验过程 15

4.6.3 实证结果的解释与分析 16

第5章 结论及政策建议 18

5.1 研究结论 18

5.2 政策建议 18

5.2.1 完善管理层激励制度 18

5.2.2 完善会计准则 19

5.2.3 加强对企业相关人员的道德教育 19

5.2.4 改进上市公司考核方式，加强监督力度 19

5.2.5 股市投资者应提高自身的辨别能力 19

参考文献 20

致 谢 22

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