摘 要

股权质押指借款人以自己的股权作为质押，为取得的贷款提供担保的行为的融资行为，由于股权具有公开性和可变现性，股权质押已经成为相关金融机构向控股股东提供贷款的基本形式，也是股东筹集资金的重要手段。随着我国金融业的发展，股权质押作为新的融资方式，已经被受到广泛关注和运用，与此同时，股权质押的风险也得以暴露，因此，研究股权质押相关效应显得尤为重要。

本文的研究目的在于通过深度刨析乐视网股权质押行为及其效应，研究股权质押在掏空、业绩及价值方面的效应，为其他存在股权质押的公司提供参考，帮助完善中国股权质押体系，保护中小股东利益。本文的理论意义在于利用委托代理理论、交易成本理论、控制权私利理论探究股权质押效应及其作用路径；利用多元回归分析实证研究股权质押在乐视网及其所属行业内的作用机制，为研究股权质押的围观路径提供了借鉴。本文的现实意义在于的得出了多条结论，有助于乐视网及互联网信息服务行业更理性客观地使用股权质押融资工具，也为相关机构的监管提供了有效参考。

本文回顾了国内外关于股权质押对大股东掏空行为的影响、股权质押对公司业绩及价值的影响的相关文献，在前人研究的基础上，以委托代理理论、优序融资理论、优序融资理论作为本文的理论基础，采用理论分析与实证检验相结合的方法，以2011年-2017年的乐视网及互联网信息服务行业共计15家公司为样本数据，分别以大股东直接占款、关联交易作为大股东掏空行为的衡量标准、托宾Q值为公司价值衡量标准，基于多元线性回归方法研究了乐视网大股东股权质押的相关效应。得出结论主要有：乐视网大股东股权质押长期内助长了其掏空行为同时降低了公司价值；互联网信息服务行业大股东的股权质押并没有助长其掏空行为也没有降低公司价值；乐视网大股东贾跃亭有进行多次股权质押做大公司后实施掏空的嫌疑。

本文的主要创新点在于，（1）以控股股东股权质押问题作为研究的主体，归纳股权质押的理论基础及作用路径，分析股权质押如何引起两权分离，助长掏空行为，损害上市公司的业绩及价值。（2）引入乐视网公司案例，对股权质押效应及其作用路径提供了实证支持。

关键词：两权分离；掏空成本；公司价值；多元线性回归

Abstract

Stock equity pledge as a method of fundraising refers to the borrower’s pledging behavior of providing guarantees for the loans obtained with own equity as a pledge. Due to the open and realizable properties of equity, it becomes the basic reason for financial institutions to provide loans to shareholders and serves as a basic bargaining chip for controlling shareholders to raise funds. With the rapid economic and social development in China, equity pledge as an emerging financing mode is attracting more and more people’s attention due to its advantages. The phenomenon of controlling shareholders’ financing by means of stock equity pledge are increasing. With the growing number of stock equity pledge, related risks caused by it are emerging. Therefore, the study on stock equity pledge of controlling shareholders seems particularly important.

The purpose of this paper is to provide references for other companies conducting the act of stock equity pledge or having the intention of stock equity pledge by profoundly analyzing LETV company’s behavior of stock equity pledge and its effect, studying the effect of stock equity pledge on company’s performance, company value and tunneling cost, so as to help improve China's stock equity pledge system and protect the interests of medium and small investors. The theoretical significance of this paper lies in applying principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory, and PBC (Private Benefits of Control) theory to explore the effects of stock equity pledge and its acting path, empirically studying the mechanism of stock equity pledge in LeTV and its industry through multiple regression analysis to provide references for studying the micro path of stock equity pledge. The realistic significance of this paper lies in the acquirement of several conclusions which can help LeTV and the Internet information service industry to use equity pledge financing tools rationally and objectively, and also provide effective reference for related institutions’ supervision.

This paper has retrospected the domestic and foreign literature about major shareholders’ tunneling, the effect of stock equity pledge on major shareholders’ tunneling, and the impact of equity pledge on company performance and value. Based on previous studies, with principal-agent theory, pecking order theory, and transaction cost theory as the theoretical basis, by means of combining theoretical analysis and empirical testing, this paper has selected a total of 15 companies in the LeTV and Internet information services industry from 2011 to 2017 as sample data to study the relevant effects of LeTV shareholders’ stock equity pledge by using major shareholder direct fund occupation and related party transaction as the measurement criteria of major shareholders’ tunneling behavior, Tobin's Q value as the measurement criteria of company value, and the multiple linear regression as the method. The main conclusions are as follows: LeTV major shareholders’ stock equity pledge has contributed to long-term tunneling behavior while reducing the value of the company; major shareholders’ stock equity pledge in the Internet information service industry has not contributed to tunneling behavior or reducing company's value; Jia Yueting, a major shareholder of LeTV, was suspected of carrying out tunneling behavior after several times’ stock equity pledge for company expansion.

Main innovation points of this paper include: (1) With the controlling shareholders’ stock equity pledge as the main subject of the study, this paper has summarized the relevant definition and theoretical basis of stock equity pledge, and analyzed how stock equity pledge of has substantially resulted in separation of two rights and infringement of interests, meanwhile damaged the listing company's operation capacity, profitability and corporate value. Based on its characteristics, this paper has concluded the effects of stock equity pledge into two types and clarified the acting path; (2) This paper has provided empirical support for the effect of stock equity pledge and its acting path by introducing the case of LeTV company.

Key words: Separation of two rights; Tunneling cost; Corporate value; Multiple linear regression